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We are accustomed to viewing the Bill of Rights as a success
story. With it, the American constitution-makers opened a new
epoch in the centuries-old struggle to place effective limits on
the abuse of state power. Not all of the Bill of Rights is a suc-
cess story, however. While we are celebrating the Bill ofRights,
we would do well to take note of that chapter of the Bill of
Rights that has been a spectacular failure: the Framers' effort to
embed jury trial as the exclusive mode of proceeding in cases
of serious crime.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF JURY TRIAL
The Sixth Amendment says: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed ...."1 "All" is not a word that con-
stitution-makers use lightly. The drafters of the Sixth Amend-
ment used it and meant it. Indeed, the Framers of the
Constitution had already used the same word for the same end
when speaking to the same subject two years earlier. Article III
of the Constitution insists: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...."2
Two hundred years later, this Constitution and its Bill of
Rights continue to govern our criminal justice system. Indeed,
because the Sixth Amendment has been treated as incorpo-
rated by the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal jury guaran-
tee now governs not only in the federal courts that the Framers
had in mind, but also in the state systems where we process the
bulk of our criminal caseloads.3
Although the texts mandate jury trial for "all" criminal cases,
• Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
2. [d. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
3. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). State constitutions contain
similar guarantees.
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the reality is far different. In place of "all," a more accurate
term to describe the use of jury trial in the discharge of our
criminal caseload would be "virtually none." Like those mag-
nificent guarantees of human rights that grace the pretended
constitutions of totalitarian states, our guarantee of routine
criminal jury trial is a fraud.
This article discusses the astonishing discrepancy between
what the constitutional texts promise and what the criminal jus-
tice system delivers.
II. NON-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Why did the Framers call for jury trial in "all" criminal cases?
They prescribed "all" because they experienced "all." In the
world in which they lived, on both sides of the Atlantic, cases of
serious crime systematically went to fulljury trial. Jury trial was
the routine dispositive proceeding of Eighteenth-Century An-
glo-American law. We have historical records from the English
sources of a few Eighteenth-Century cases in which some pa-
thetic accused, caught in the act or otherwise sensing the hope-
lessness of his case, attempted to plead guilty. In these cases,
the trial judge resisted accepting the guilty plea. Time and
again the judge urged the accused to plead "not guilty" and to
take his case to the jury.4 The great historian of English crimi-
nal law, John Beattie of Toronto, has studied this question
closely in the surviving Eighteenth-Century records of the
county of Surrey, south of London. He reports: "Virtually
every prisoner charged with a felony insisted on taking his trial,
with the obvious support and encouragement of the court.
There was no plea bargaining in felony cases in the eighteenth
century."s
Return now from the Framers' world of routine jury trial to
the practice ofour own day. The Constitution has not changed,
the Bill of Rights remains in force, and jury trial lives on in the
law books as our prototypical mode of discharging cases of se-
rious crime. Furthermore, were you to form your impression of
modern American criminal procedure from our popular cul-
ture, as nonlawyers and foreigners tend to do, you would
4. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
278-79 (1978) (reporting cases).
5. JOHN M. BEA'ITIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660·1800, at 336·37
(1986); see itt. at 446·47.
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scarcely have occasion to notice that anything has changed.
Television is busy broadcasting courtroom dramas that
culminate in the verdict of a criminal jury trial.
Those who understand our criminal justice system know bet-
ter. Criminal jury trial has all but disappeared in the United
States. Can you find it? Of course, you can find it. You can find
it in the show trials of the day, Oliver North, General Noriega,
or whatever. But jury trial no longer typifies our system. Can
you find a hippopotamus in the Bronx? Yes, there's one in the
Bronx Zoo, but it has nothing to do with life in the Bronx. It's a
goner. And so, too, stunningly, is criminal jury trial, which has
ceased to typify American criminal justice. The criminal justice
system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious crime with-
out jury trial, through the plea bargaining system. This non-
trial procedure has become the ordinary dispositive procedure
of American criminal justice.6
The plea bargaining system operates by threat. The authori-
ties who administer our non-jury and non-trial procedure tell
the accused in effect: "So you want your constitutional right to
jury trial? By all means, be our guest. But beware. If you claim
this right and are convicted, we will punish you twice, once for
the offense, and once again for having displayed the temerity to
exercise your constitutional right to jury trial." Our authorities
are, of course, more circumspect in their discourse. They do
not need to convey this threat in the bald fashion that I have
just expressed it. There is no doubt, however, that plea bar-
gaining works precisely in this way. Whether plea bargaining
takes the form of charge bargaining (a lesser offense in ex-
change for a guilty plea) or sentence bargaining (a reduced
sanction in exchange for a guilty plea), the object is to coerce
the accused to surrender his right to jury trial by threatening
him with a materially greater sanction if he exercises that right.
In observing that the Framers spoke of jury trial in "all"
cases of serious crime-that jury trial was their norm-I do not
mean to say that they mandated jury trial. Jury trial was indeed
waivable. Then as now, the defendant had the option to plead
6. In the state courts that handle most of the criminal caseload, 95% of felony con-
victions occur without jury trial; 91 % are plea bargained; 4% occur at bench trial. See
UNITED STATES DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS: 1988, at 1 (1990). Bench trial is a latter-day American novelty. See Susan
C. Towne, The Historical Origins ofBench TrialfoT Serious Crime, 26 AM.j. LEG. HIST. 123
(1982).
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guilty. What he lacked was the inducement. Because
prosecutorial authorities were not yet in the business of pres-
suring people to decline trial, the Framers did not forbid prac-
tices that they had no reason to foresee.
III. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF JURY TRIAL
How did criminal jury trial disappear? There is much we do
not know, but the historical outline seems tolerably clear.7 The
starting point is to understand that criminal jury trial as the
Framers observed it on both sides of the Atlantic in the second
half of the Eighteenth Century was a summary proceeding.
The trial that the Framers thought they were constitutionaliz-
ing was, by our standards, shockingly brusque and deficient in
safeguard. In the Old Bailey in London, the principal court for
the trial of serious crime in the Anglo-American world, a dozen
or more cases offelony jury trial went forward in a single court-
room in a single day.8 The procedures were crude. Lawyers
were infrequently involved for prosecution or defense.9 There
was almost no law of evidence. The "beyond-reasonable-
doubt" standard of proof was neither precisely formulated nor
routinely announced. 10 There was no voir dire of jurors; chal-
lenge rights were virtually never exercised. Jurors sat on many
trials during a single session, and many of them were exper-
ienced veterans who had sat at previous sessions. They re-
ceived little judicial guidance and may not have needed
much. 11 The accused conducted his own defense, usually with-
out aid of counsel, and without being allowed to testify under
oath. There was virtually no appellate review of trials. Indeed,
capital convicts were usually executed within days of trial, un-
less the trial judge took the special step of reprieving the con-
vict in order to allow post-verdict proceedings. Because the
system effectively lacked appellate redress, there was no occa-
7. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. I (1979);
see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAUFORNIA, 1870-1910 (1981); John H.
Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & SOC'y REV. 261
(1979); Mary E. Vogel, Courts of Trade: Social Conflict and the Emergence of Plea
Bargaining in Boston, Massachusetts, 1830-1890 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D disserta-
tion, Harvard University, Univ. Microfilms No. 8901664).
8. See Langbein, supra note 4, at 277.
9. See id. at 282-83.
10. See id. at 284.
11. See id. at 276, 284.
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sion for those features of modem trial practice that are associ-
ated with the enterprise of provoking and preserving error for
appeal.12
We understand that a criminal procedural system so brusque
could not have endured. The procedural system that the Fram-
ers presupposed when they constitutionalized jury trial was
grievously deficient. No one can yearn for the good old days
when an Old Bailey judge could try a dozen felons a day. The
movement for greater safeguard in criminal procedure that in-
tensified in the later Eighteenth Century and across the Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Centuries was benign in spirit, and it was
in a deep sense inevitable. But there are many ways to increase
the level ofsafeguard and, in the light of hindsight, one can see
that the path taken in Anglo-American law was catastrophic.
Whereas the Europeans of this period were refining the tech-
niques of an increasingly trustworthy, officialized system of im-
partial evidence-gathering and prosecuting, the Anglo-
American systems turned for safeguard down the path of parti-
san lawyerization. We came to experience the capture of the
criminal trial by lawyers-lawyers for the defense and for the
prosecution. The rise of the adversarial system led to the loss
of the accused as a testimonial resource, and to the vast elabo-
ration of the law of evidence and of trial procedure that was
undertaken in a forlorn effort to regulate adversary combat.
Jury trial was redefined as adversary jury trial. The explosive
combination ofadversary procedure and criminal jury trial pro-
duced a system so clumsy, so time-consuming, and so costly
that, in the end, Americans found it intolerable to honor the
Framers' promise to use jury trial in "all" criminal cases. As a
result, the pressure to subvert adversary jury trial has grown
ever more intense across the last century.
IV. EVILS OF NON-TRIAL PROCEDURE
What is so bad about plea bargaining? A good way to ap-
proach that question is to ask why the Framers so valued jury
trial. Plea bargaining suppresses both the jury and the trial.
There are important virtues to each. The jury disperses power
away from the officers of the state. Because the sanctions ap-
12. See generally BEAlTIE, supra note 5, at 348-50 (describing the "old" form of trial);
Langbein, supra, note 4, at 263.
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plied in the criminal justice system are so ominous, the danger
of abuse of state power in criminal procedure is serious. Plea
bargaining achieves just what the Framers expected the jury to
prevent, the aggrandizement of state power. Plea bargaining
transfers the power of condemnation to a low-visibility deci-
sionmaker, the prosecutor. Because negotiation replaces trial,
plea bargaining substitutes an essentially concealed procedure
for the salutary openness of public jury trial. The prosecutor
who operates the negotiated plea system exercises awesome
powers, powers that were meant to be shared with judges and
jurors. As a practical matter, plea bargaining concentrates both
the power to adjudicate and the power to sentence in the hands
of the prosecutor.
Plea bargaining is also wrong because it is coercive. A legal
system that comes to depend upon coercing people to waive
their supposed rights is by definition a failed system. The sys-
tem can no longer function by adhering to its own stated prin-
ciples. Plea bargainip.g puts the accused under ferocious
pressure to bear false witness against himself. 13 As the disparity
grows between the sentence offered for confession and the sen-
tence threatened for conviction upon trial, the inducement to
confess becomes ever more intense. I do not think that large
numbers of innocent people are confessing themselves guilty
to crimes committed by strangers. At the margin, however,
such cases do indeed arise. 14
The want of trial is also costly in another way. There is an
important civic interest in having public inquiry and adjudica-
tion take place in cases of serious crime-a positive externality,
the economists would say. Plea bargaining prevents the citi-
zenry from learning about the circumstances of the crime and
punishment. There is, for example, a lingering distaste among
substantial sections of the American people about the way that
James Earl Ray was sent off to prison in Tennessee. Without
trial, we do not feel adequately informed about whether our
institutions have responded fully and fairly to events.
In the end, however, the worst aspect of plea bargaining is
simply the dishonesty. Charge bargaining has made our crimi-
nal statistics into hash. The person who committed murder is
13. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978).
14. See Albert w. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 61 (1968) (discussing an example of coercive plea bargaining).
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pretended to have committed manslaughter; the person whose
real crime was child molesting is convicted of loitering around
a schoolyard.15 Not only has this willful mislabelling turned our
criminal statistics into a pack of lies, it has also forced us into
the widespread practice of preferring arrest records over con-
viction records for a host of purposes. Continental observers
find our reliance upon bare arrest records in matters of sen-
tencing and employment to be incredible.16 And looming over
the whole of the saga of plea bargaining is the lie that has to be
lived to escape the Constitution and the Bill of Rights-the lie
that persons accused of serious crime really do not want a jury
trial.
V. MARKETS
The Supreme Court's justification for plea bargaining,
though wholly unprincipled, possesses the virtue of candor. In
Santobello v. New York,17 ChiefJustice Burger explained that plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because "[i]f every criminal
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number ofjudges and court facilities."ls Translation: We can-
not afford the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Sheer expe-
diency is rationale enough for disregarding the constitutional
texts.
The most prominent academic effort to justify plea bargain-
ing is Frank Easterbrook's chilling paper, "Criminal Procedure
as a Market System."19 Easterbrook correctly observes that the
behavior of actors in the plea bargaining system is market-like.
Under the constraints of the system, they behave rationally,
maximize their utiles, allocate their resources, and so forth.20 It
is indeed quite a glorious Turkish rug market that we have cre-
ated in lieu of what the Framers designed. Easterbrook's paper
assumes away the vital question, which is what purpose the
Framers ascribed to jury trial. Did they mean for this entitle-
15. See David Sudnow, Nonnal Crimes: Sociow~al Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255, 258-59 (1965).
16. See Miljan Damska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models ojCriminal Pro-
cedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 533 (1973).
17. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
18. [d. at 260.
19. 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
20. See id. at 308-09.
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ment to be sold at the Turkish market with the other rugs? I
think not. They had public purposes in mind when envisioning
that "all" serious criminal cases would go to jury trial. To say
that we have constructed a market in criminal procedural rights
is a condemnation, not a justification.
VI. THE FRAGILTIY OF THE WRITIEN TEXTS
The disappearance ofcriminal jury trial offers as telling a les-
son as one could wish about the myth of written constitutions.
Constitutional texts do not enforce themselves. They require
the adherence and support both of the social and political or-
der and of the legal system and legal professionals. Plea bar-
gaining has defeated the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
because legal professionals-especially judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys-have preferred the convenience of do-
ing deals to the rigor of trying cases.
I am left to say that much more attention should be given to
how we handle criminal adjudication. I believe that concession-
ary non-trial procedure is wrong. Condemnation without adju-
dication, which is effectively what we practice in the plea
bargaining system, is wrong. On the other hand, we do not
want to recover the procedural world that the Framers envi-
sioned, the world of summary jury trial. Nor can we afford the
routine adversary jury trial that is the norm of our formal law.
Events that we cannot foresee but whose happening we can
predict with serene certainty will one day force us to rethink
our failed system of criminal procedure. We will be driven to
re-introduce some component of genuine adjudication into our
criminal procedure, perhaps on the platform of the existing
Rule 11 hearing that is at present mostly a formalism.21 When
we do, I hope that we might pay attention to the Continental
model. More than a century ago, Europeans came to look at
Anglo-American criminal justice. They took back with them the
notion that lay participation in criminal adjudication is pro-
foundly important, but they also came to the conclusion that
systems of mass justice appropriate to urban industrial democ-
racies could not use laypersons in the clumsy, time-consuming,
costly fashion of the adversary jury trial. The Europeans de-
vised ways of combining laypersons with professional judges in
21. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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streamlined procedures that guarantee significant lay participa-
tion in every case of serious crime.22 The result is that they
have perpetuated more of our jury tradition than we have.
They have a system of routine lay participation in every case of
serious crime, whereas we have a system of full-dress adversary
jury trial so complex that we must deny it to almost all
defendants.
22. See John H. Langbein. Mixed Court andJury Court: Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need? 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195.
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